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Abstract
Using panel data for 2,329 Belgian firms observed between 1985 and 1999, this
paper aims at getting a better understanding of Belgian firms' investment behavior.  Two
main and interrelated topics are investigated: the link between financial structure and
investment decision, on the one hand, the effect of uncertainty on the level of investment,
on the other hand.  Such research sets forth the effect of some key variables, both in terms
of level and volatility.  The study is conducted within a structural approach but reduced
form equations are also estimated.  A generalised dynamic effect is investigated by
introducing adjustment costs related through time.  From that study, it clearly appears that
small firms and high debt level firms are more sensitive to interest rate and cash flow.
However, no role for investment price volatility is observed.
JEL Classification: C23; C33, E22
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Editorial
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This research aims at getting a better understanding of Belgian ﬁrms’ investment behavior, and
to provide us with useful lessons regarding the best way to cope with individual investment in
Belgium, both in terms of economic policy and research methodology.
It appears in the context of the recent ﬂow of literature on the subject, although it is adapted
to individual data, especially those based on annual accounts1. Two main and interrelated
topics are investigated, explaining, at least theoretically, some stylized facts of today investment
behavior. The ﬁrst one is the link between ﬁnancial structure and investment decision, in
line with the family of contributions initiated by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen [1988] on the
existence of capital markets imperfections and its possible implication for investment ﬁnancing.
The second topic is the eect of uncertainty on the level of investment, in line with Dixit and
Pyndick’s [1994] seminal contribution in the real approach tradition.
More speciﬁcally, the ﬁnance side of the research focuses on the validation of hypothesis
regarding the sensitiveness of investment to the availability of internal funds and the existence
of imperfections on the credit market, thus on reasons for including in investment equations
such variables like cash ﬂow, debt level and speciﬁc interest rates. It belongs to the range of
studies where a ﬁnancial constraint is introduced through an upper limit to indebtedness, which
involves a risk premium associated to debt-speciﬁci n t e r e s tr a t e( s e eW h i t e d[ 1 9 9 2 ]a n dB o n d
and Meghir [1994]). Recent related work on Belgian ﬁgures has been proposed for instance by
Tychon [1997], Bond, Elston, Mairesse and Mulkay [1997] and Barran and Peeters [1998]. That
ﬁnance side is extended by the introduction of uncertainty, speciﬁcally on investment goods
price measured assuming stochastic processes - see Leahy and Whited [1996] or Peeters [1997]
on Belgian data -. To tackle with the dynamic nature of investment, an augmented quadratic
adjustment function is introduced, so that the costs due to any change in the stock of capital
are related through time - see Sensenbrenner [1991].
Methodologically, two modeling strategies are used in the exercise.
The ﬁrst one focuses on the evaluation of speciﬁcations already present in the literature or
obtained in our eort of generalization; it is conducted in a Euler equations framework, the most
usual approach in recent literature on investment (see the references above). However, the strong
non-linearity at work in this class of models makes it di!cult, or even impossible, to obtain
solved reduced forms for investment equations needed to conduct economic policy exercises.
Interactions between ﬁnance and investment in the framework of linear reduced forms have
been examined in some recent studies. de Haan [1996] has estimated a system of simultaneous
equations for investment, dividends and indebtedness. Stanca [1998] has proposed to use
a vector autoregressive model while Chirinko, Fazzari and Meyer [1999] have more speciﬁcally
studied the eect of the user cost of capital within a model inspired by the neoclassical approach
of Eisner and Nadiri [1968], which is itself an extension of the seminal work by Jorgenson [1963].
So, in the second strategy, we investigate reduced forms based on our hypothesis regarding
ﬁnance and uncertainty. An expected outcome is to isolate determinants which are speciﬁct o
some classes of ﬁrms. Those models mainly come from a linearization of Euler equations used
in the structural part of the study - see Chatelain [2000] for the case of ﬁnancial constraints -.
1The availability of those data is a unique opportunity for the authors to go ahead with their research on
investment in Belgium (see references); they are especially grateful to the National Bank of Belgium for that
opportunity.
2After the survey of literature of section 2, the paper elaborates on a model of investment
behavior in section 3. The empirical exercise, conducted using a panel of 2,329 Belgian ﬁrms
observed over 11 to 15 years (1985-1999), is reported in section 4; in that section, a simulation
of the eect of a change in the speciﬁc interest rate is also proposed. Finally, section 5 concludes
the study and suggests some directions for further research.
2. Survey of the literature
Unsurprisingly, two lines of literature are especially relevant for our research.
2.1. Financial structure and investment
Integration of the ﬁnance dimension in investment analysis remained for a long time a strictly
empirical issue. Some authors, including Tinbergen [1939], Meyer and Kuh [1957] and Klein
[1974] set among investment determinants a liquidity variable like proﬁts, but they failed to
provide a convincing link with economic theory. In a disequilibrium, or equilibrium with
rationing context, Malinvaud [1981] showed that when proﬁts are random, solvability constraint,
i.e. the necessity to pay interests on debts and to refund debts at maturity, involves an upper
limit to the rate of indebtedness which increases a.o. with the level of expected proﬁts. As a
consequence, such a constraint reduces opportunities for investment ﬁnancing (see Artus and
Muet [1984] for details).
A more recent line of literature tried to test the Modigliani and Miller [1958] hypothesis
for which internal and external ﬁnance are perfect substitutes, so that investment decision is
independent of the ﬁnancing conditions of the ﬁrm. Such a view has been challenged by authors
like Duesenberry [1958] but got renewed support from important contributors like Fazzari, Hub-
bard and Petersen [1988], Schiantarelli [1996] and Hubbard [1998] : for them, the existence of
imperfections on ﬁnancial markets can exert a strong inﬂuence on the ﬁnancial structure of the
ﬁrm.
Otherwise, Akerlof [1970], Myers and Majluf [1984] and Greenwald, Stiglitz and Weiss
[1984] analyzed information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the framework of
the principal-agent theory. Thus, it may be that banks decide on ceilings on their loans or on
higher interest rates when they expect the borrower not to reveal some key information that he
is the sole owner of, on e.g. the value of the ﬁrm or the risk of the investment project. Such
asymmetry introduces a gap between external and internal sources of funds, which is translated
into an agency cost. An agency cost related to the size of the debt has otherwise been investi-
gated by Jensen and Meckling [1976], Myers [1977] and more recently Jaramillo, Schiantarelli
and Weiss [1996].
Moreover, due to a high risk of bankruptcy, banks can refrain from agreeing to lend money.
Then high bankruptcy costs increase the probability that unguaranteed debts will not be re-
funded when ﬁrm closes down (see Chatelain [1995], Bond and Meghir [1994] and Cuthbertson
and Gasparro [1995]). By contrast, Ross [1977] and Leland and Pyle [1977] show that the size
of the commercial debt can be interpreted by lenders as a signal of the stockholders’ belief in
the good health of the company, as argued by Biais and Gollier [1995].
Finally, important transaction costs linked to some sources of ﬁnance, e.g. issuing costs or
tax discrimination - on the latter one see e.g. Gérard [1982b], King and Fullerton [1984], Poterba
3and Summers [1983], Devereux, Keen and Schiantarelli [1994] - also have an eect on a ﬁrm’s
real decisions.
All those imperfections result in a possible, sometimes ﬁrm-speciﬁc, hierarchy among the
sources of funds, which can in turn explain why investment expenditures can be limited by the
capacity to use internal ﬁnance. Such a view provides a theoretical support to the frequently,
and often signiﬁcantly, observed relation between real investment expenditures and ﬁnancial
v a r i a b l e ss u c ha sp r o ﬁta n dc a s hﬂow.23
2.2. Irreversibility, Uncertainty and Investment
In a line of research initiated by Lucas and Prescott [1971], and renewed by Pindyck [1991],
Dixit and Pindyck [1994] put together irreversibility of investment and sunk costs associated to
disinvestment; in their analysis, demand uncertainty is modelled using a stochastic process on
output price, deemed to be aected by random shocks. In such a context, it can pay o for an
investor to postpone his decision and thus to wait in order to get additional information on future
prospects. Then the option for waiting has a value, and the usual NPV rule is no longer valid.
Therefore, a project will be considered if the value that it generates exceeds its purchase and
installation cost by more than the value of the option for waiting; in fact, investment is compared
to a call-type option in ﬁnance, and deciding on actually investing is similar to exercising the
option. Abel and Eberly [1993, 1994] have also shown that investment irreversibility, translated
into asymmetric adjustment costs, deﬁne an inaction where the sole optimal decision for the
ﬁrm is to not invest (see also Abel and Eberly [1996] and Barnett and Sakellaris [1998])
Regarding the sign of the eect of uncertainty on investment decision, Bertola [1987], and
then Pindyck [1988], stressed a negative relation when returns are decreasing or competition is
imperfect, but without adjustment technology. That negative or irreversibility eect, is linked
to a positive value of waiting, since accumulating too much capital can be costly if demand turns
out to be actually weaker. By contrast, Hartman [1972] and Abel [1983, 1985] have shown a
positive eect of uncertainty in a context of constant returns with convex adjustment costs.
That eect is due to the convex relation between marginal proﬁt and the parameter reﬂecting
uncertainty such as prices; however, that view is not supported by the empirical results obtained
by Leahy and Whited [1996].
The type of uncertainty is also a key issue. Uncertainty can be either microeconomic, based
on ﬁrm-speciﬁc idiosyncratic shocks, or macroeconomic, and thus aggregate. Aggregation of
investment behaviors subject to such uncertainties has been investigated a.o. by Bertola and
Caballero [1991, 1994] and Caballero and Engel [1991]. It seems that absent aggregate uncer-
tainty, distribution of aggregate investment cannot be characterized, a view recently extended
by Caballero and Engle [1999]. Verschueren [2000a] provides an original application of the
aggregation process in the case of a strongly irreversible investment, using the indirect inference
method of estimation.
2Manigart, Baeyens and Verschueren [2002] studied the degree of information asymmetry by testing the
sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow when Belgian unquoted companies receive venture capital.
3Cash ﬂow sensitivity could also be analysed in the background of R&D investment. For the Belgian case,
Cincera [2002] investigated the possible existence of liquidity constraints for Belgian investment both in capital
and R&D. Bastin, Corhay, Hubner and Michel [2002] studied interactions between investment and ﬁnancing
decisions of R&D-intensive ﬁrms from biotechnology sector. Van Cayseele [2002] used the book value of R&D to
deal with the corporate governance aspects of the investment cash-ﬂow sensitivity.
4Finally, Carruth, Dickerson and Henley [2000] surveyed the main empirical results regarding
t h ee v a l u a t i o no ft h ee ect of uncertainty on investment, at ﬁrm as well as at industry level.
3. Modeling Investment Behavior
In this section, we develop the theoretical model and discuss the estimation strategies.
3.1. The model
T h ev a l u eo faﬁrm i is deﬁned as the discounted sum of present and expected dividend ﬂows
conditional to the available set of information and a discounting rate tentatively noted rt.U s i n g
the equality between cash inﬂows and cash outﬂows, the dividend at time t, Di,t can be expressed
as
Di,t =( 1  t)(pi,tF[Ki,t1,L i,t]  wi,tLi,t
it1Bi,t1  pI
i,tGi,t)+Bi,t  Bi,t1  pI
i,tIi,t (3.1)
with t the corporate income tax rate, pi,t the output price, F[Ki,t1,L i,t] the total output
produced with two inputs, capital stock Ki,t1 and the labor force Li,t, F being assumed to be
homogenous of order one; wi,t is wage rate, Bi,t the corporate debt, it the nominal interest rate
on debt, pI
i,t the price of investment goods, Ii,t total investment and Gi,t a convex installation
function reﬂecting that modifying the level of capital stock is a costly activity. Cash ﬂow is
deﬁned as CFi,t = pi,tF[Ki,t1,L i,t]  wi,tLi,t.
In order to add an uncertainty eect on prices, we introduce a stochastic shock %i,t which
only aects the price of new investment4, not the adjustment in capital stock; then that price
becomes e pI
i,t = pI
i,t+%i,t with %i,t  N(0,2
i). Therefore, the last term in (3.1) is to be regarded
as a variable investment costs with e pI
i,tIi,t substituted for pI
i,tIi,t. We will return to the way %i,t
can be constructed at the end of this subsection.
Since timing is an important feature in investment decision we want to capture some dynamics
and, for that purposes, we choose the following speciﬁcation for Gi,t, which is checked to be























capital stock itself being constructed with the usual dynamic accumulation equation Ki,t =
(1  )Ki,t1 + Ii,t where  is the deterioration rate of capital goods.
Moreover, to allow the output variable to play an active role, a common feature in most
empirical work, we assume that ﬁrms have some market power, so that they face a demand
curve with ² the elasticity of demand with respect to price.
4We could introduce other forms of uncertainty too, like uncertainty on the possibility to sell output or on
output price.
53.1.1. Financial constraints
Two ﬁnancial constraints are introduced. The ﬁrst one is related to the non-negativity of
dividend: Di,t  0. The second one makes sense when a ﬁrm is in a debt constrained regime,
i.e. Bi,t  Bi,t with Bi,t the maximum amount that can be borrowed by ﬁrm i.
The optimization of the objective program with respect to labor, investment, accumulated
capital and the size of the debt, thus the structure of corporate ﬁnance, subject to the constraints
mentioned above, needs to use a generalized Lagrangian. For each period t, standard ﬁrst-order
conditions with respect to K, I and L are easily derived. Since we have a constraint on the





















1+itEt {1  t+1}
(3.3)




i,t+j the multipliers associated with the constraint
on dividend and on debt, respectively. Therefore, we obtain 
D





i,t  0, (Bi,t  Bi,t)  0, 
B
i,t(Bi,t  Bi,t)=0 .
In (3.3), the left hand term is actually the transformed discount rate of the model. Compared
to an unconstrained ﬁrm, a ﬁrm facing a binding debt constraint will use a higher discounting
rate for the ﬂow of future earnings, since 
B
i,t > 0. Assuming that this higher discounting rate is
captured by the capital market mechanisms, the rate of interest on debt will be higher for this
constrained ﬁrm.
At this stage, a major problem occurs since the theoretical model doesn’t provide us with
an analytical solution for the slackness parameters 
0s, so that they are unknown. To meet that
problem, the direction chosen in this study consists in stating that the ﬁrm speciﬁc interest rate








1+itEt {1  t+1}
=
1
1+ii,tEt {1  t+1}
(3.4)
To observe ii,t, it is possible to use ﬁnancial information given in panel data - see van Ees et
al. [1997] -. Indeed, let the observed ﬁrm-speciﬁc average interest rate on interest-bearing debt,
ri,t,b ed e ﬁned as ri,t = i,t(iS
t +i,t)+(1i,t)(iL
t +i,t) where i,t is the ratio between short
term and long term debt, iS
t and iL
t are risk free short-term and long-term corporate interest
rates supposed equal across ﬁrms, and i,t is the ﬁrm-speciﬁcr i s kp r e m i u m ,a s s u m e dt ob et h e
same on long- and short-term debt. Then, since ii,t = it+i,t,w eg e tii,t = ri,t i,t(iS
t iL
t )6.
5An alternative solution is proposed by Whited [1992], who expresses the unknown part of (3.4) as a quadratic
form of two observable ratios. The ﬁrst one is the ratio between the market value of the ﬁrm’s debt and the
market value of its total assets, named a debt-asset ratio or DAR. The second one, called the interest coverage
ratio, or ICR, is the ratio of the ﬁrm’s interest expenditures to the sum of interest expenditures and cash ﬂow.
6Bond and Meghir [1994] write ii,t as the sum of the market interest rate it and a risk premium, the latter
being related to debt and capital by a quadratic functional form.
6Substituting this observed speciﬁc interest rate in (3.4) and using the set of ﬁrst order conditions,












































In order to take the eect of uncertainty on investment price into account, we consider an AR(a)
representation for this variable,
pI
i,t = 0 + 1pI
i,t1 + ... + apI
i,ta + i,t (3.6)
with i,t an error term, or the unpredictable part of the investment price.
This error term i,t has a time part t and a idiosyncratic part i.A ﬁrm-speciﬁc uncertainty
measure is built up using the estimate of the standard deviation of the i’s, denoted b i.T h e
latter eect has, however, no time dimension, so that it is common to weigh it with a time
dependent ratio. We opt for the asset-to-equity ratio as in Peeters [1997]. The argument behind
this view is that more (viz : less) uncertainty is expected to be faced by ﬁrms with higher
(viz : lower) debt levels.7 Denoting this ratio i,t, the uncertainty eect on prices becomes
b ui,t = i,tb i. Then, relating the shock aecting investment price with this uncertainty measure,
one gets %i,t = b ui,t + i,twith i,t a white noise and  a parameter.
3.2. Alternative estimation strategies
Two strategies can be adopted to estimate the model, ﬁrst a structural approach,t h eareduced
form approach.
3.2.1. Direct estimation of the structural parameters
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, all expectations terms can be replaced by their
observed values. This implies the introduction of a general expectation error, ei,t+1, orthogonal
to the set of information at period t. With such a decomposition, (3.5) becomes the dynamic
non-linear structural model,
k0






i,tm + di + dt+1 + ei,t+1 (3.7)
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The key determinants are the cash ﬂow ratio (c), the output ratio (y), the user cost of capital
(s), the uncertainty eect (u
0
) and the dynamics (k
00
tm). The set of structural parameters is
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3.2.2. Reduced form approach
The second strategy is based on a reduced form approach, solving the model for investment. Un-
fortunately, an exact solution for (3.7) does not exist. So we need to use a linear approximation,
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8Clearly that assumption removes any ﬁscal policy assessment, though taxation rate has been considered as
a crucial determinant to investment in some part of the theoretical literature.
8and parameters *0
s coming from linearization.9
Interestingly, due to the linearity in variables, expectations can now be solved together
with the investment scheme, allowing us to consider economic policy assessment. The solution,
however, needs additional assumptions on the way exogenous variables behave over time. More
particularly, these movements have to be modelled by autoregressive, or AR, processes - see
Blanchard and Khan [1980] -. Bearing in mind the annual nature of the data and the dynamic
links enlightened in the theoretical model, it seems realistic to retain AR(1) models for output-
to-capital ratio, wage-to-capital ratio, user cost and uncertainty. Recalling our deﬁnition of
uncertainty, we then assume that asset-to-equity ratio ﬁts the AR(1) proﬁle. Besides, to be
able to conduct policy exercises on speciﬁc interest rates - see below -, we have to estimate the
strength in the dynamics of the user cost of capital apart from the model. Previous studies - see
a.o. Verschueren [2000] on time series - have already suggested that interest rate ﬁts a random
walk process.





kmki,tm + yyi,t + $$i,t + ssi,t + ub u00
i,t + di + dt + ei,t (3.9)
4. Finance, uncertainty and investment in the Belgian manufacturing
industry (1985-1999)
This section ﬁrst presents the data, further detail being provided in the appendix. Then it turns
to the results and their interpretation before performing an economic policy simulation.
4.1. The data set
Data used in this exercise come from the balance sheets reported accounts data base of the
National Bank of Belgium. From the 15,000 ﬁrm data base, an unbalanced panel of 2,329 ﬁrms
has been extracted, which is observed over between 11 and 15 years. A larger coverage in terms
of ﬁrms is possible but then on a shorter length of time; we decided to give priority to the length
of the series in order to go across possible economic cycles. We supplemented that data base by
ﬁgures from the Belgian National Accounts, especially for prices (using output and investment
deﬂators), while nominal interest rates come from the Mémentos économiques et ﬁnanciers,a
Kluwer publication, and the SNCI / NMKN, the National Company for Credit to Industry.
The data are presented with more details in the appendix where statistics on speciﬁc interest
rates, debt-equity structures and speciﬁc tax rates are also provided.
9Therefore, structural parameters can not be retrieved from the 0s since the binding functions with the
structural parameters are unknown. However, an indirect inference procedure could be applied to overcome this
problem, but this is beyond the scope of this study.
10As mentioned in Verschueren and Gérard [2000], this dynamic equation could be transformed in order to
separate the long- and short-run movements of investment and deal with non stationarity. Changes in investment
a r ea n a l y z e dw i t h i na ne r r o rc o r r e c t i o n( E C )m o d e lw i t hﬁrst dierence variables. We actually tried to conduct
a cointegration inference adapted for panel data (see Pesaran and Smith [1995] or Harris et Tzavalis [1999]), but
failed to get convincing results.
94.2. Results and interpretations
The estimation technique used in this paper is the GMM approach to unbalanced panel developed
by Arellano and Bond [1991]. Unbalanced panel data refers to a sample in which consecutive
observations on individuals are available, but the number of time periods available can vary
according to individuals. Basically, in this approach, the unobserved individual eects are
eliminated by applying a forward ’orthogonal deviations’ transformation on all variables of
the model. This ensures the absence of correlation between the transformed error terms and
lagged values of the untransformed dependent variable, which can therefore be used as valid
instruments. Actually, GMM estimators typically use more orthogonality conditions than their
IV counterparts. Moreover, they take the covariance structure of the disturbances into account
and are therefore asymptotically more e!cient - see Kiviet [1995] -.
Equations (3.7) and (3.9) have been estimated in ﬁrst dierences, coping with the possible
non-stationarity in regressors. For our instrument set we chose variables lagged at periods t2
and t  3. Two important statistics are provided. The Sargan statistics (SG) is the test of
overidentifying restrictions, investigating whether the orthogonality conditions are respected.
Under the null hypothesis, SG follows a "2 law, with the number of variables minus the number
of instruments as number of degrees of freedom. On the other hand, the M1 statistics is a test for
ﬁrst-order serial correlation on residuals from the (ﬁrst dierence) speciﬁcation; it is distributed
q N (0,1).
Before assessing the empirical performance of the models, we have to conduct an estimation
ruling out the price of investment, in order to get an estimate of the uncertainty measure of
this variable. So, ﬁrst of all, we estimate an autoregressive model like (3.6) to get a sector-
speciﬁc value. As in Verschueren [2000a], there is a clear evidence that each pI
s,t follows a simple
random walk, so that  =1 . Next, a time-dependent and ﬁrm-dependent measure is built up
using, as was done previously, equation b ui,t = i,tb i, with a normalization with respect to the
asset-to-equity ratio.
4.2.1. Structural approach
Table 1 presents the estimation results of equation (3.7) for the whole set of data, i.e. for all
ﬁrms. Since there is more to learn from the model by investigating regimes where speciﬁc
(expected) behaviors can be observed, we ﬁrst make a distinction between small and large ﬁrms
in order to capture a size eect - tables 2a and 2b - and between ﬁrms with high and low leverage
- tables 3a and 3b -. For the ﬁrst breakdown, ﬁrms are distributed on the basis of their capital
stock (low level versus high level of capital); the threshold value is the mean value from the
panel, and it is compared to ﬁrms’ mean values. The alternative analysis is based on leverage:
high debt level ﬁrms are isolated from low debt level ﬁrms. Again the threshold is the average
debt level.
Each table is splited into two parts. On the left hand side, uncertainty on investment prices
is not taken into account, i.e.  =0 , while, on the right hand side, uncertainty parameter b u
is estimated. On both sides, perfect and imperfect competition cases are investigated through
the role of output (and hence b y). Also, a dynamic eect is either absent or present through
b k,1. Standard errors of estimated coe!cients are given by b [.].
Finally Table 4 contains retrieved values for the set of structural parameters, based on the
results obtained from the best equation for each regime.
10L e tu sn o t et h a tt h eS G - t e s ti sn e v e rs i g n i ﬁcant and that a signiﬁcant serial correlation in
the residuals is detected in two cases only, which are not the ones used to compute the values
of the structural parameters reported in table 4.
Full sample. From the full sample results, there is clear evidence that the cash ﬂow variable
matters since b c is always signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. Also, a dynamic eect is at work,




. The role of the
interest rate, through the user cost of capital, is less obvious, although signiﬁcant at 90 percent
(b s). It is interesting to observe that all signs are consistent with economic theory. However,
imperfect competition on goods market cannot be retained, since the inclusion of output ratio




. Finally, we are unable to retain a relation between
price-uncertainty and investment since the estimated coe!cient b u is never signiﬁcantly dierent
from zero.
Tab 1. Equation (3.7), full sample
b c 0.610* 0.672* 0.607* 0.679* 0.609* 0.672* 0.608* 0.677*
b [b c] 0.080 0.071 0.083 0.074 0.081 0.074 0.083 0.076
b s -0.418 -0.411 -0.437 -0.412 -0.418 -0.412 -0.435 -0.411
b [b s] 0.235 0.222 0.231 0.222 0.235 0.224 0.233 0.221
b y 0 0 0.005 -0.053 0 0 -0.015 -0.060
b [b y] - - 0.051 0.050 - - 0.052 0.047
b k,1 00 . 5 9 9 *00 . 6 0 1 *00 . 5 9 8 *00 . 6 2 3 *
b [b k,1] -0 . 2 4 1-0 . 2 4 2-0 . 2 4 4-0 . 2 4 4
b u 0000 2.133 0.154 1.276 1.332
b [b u] ---- 5.34 5.13 5.29 5.19
SG 35.8 38.2 39.3 40.3 36.9 41.3 42.5 43.7
M1 -1.03 0.41 1.21 0.93 -1.02 -0.07 0.38 0.64
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Size eect. Very interesting features now appear. First, lower capital level ﬁrms are more
sensitive to cash ﬂow (b c) than higher capital level ﬁrms. This is consistent with the hypothesis
that small ﬁrms rely more on, or may be constrained by, internal funds. Second, the eect
of the user cost of capital (b s), the key neoclassical variable, is signiﬁcantly dierent from zero
at 95 percent for small ﬁrms, but it is hardly detected for large ﬁrms. The role of a speciﬁc
interest rate is therefore more crucial for small ﬁrms, a slight change in that variable being
expected to have a large eect on investment. The cash ﬂow and the user cost eects do not




is now a more signiﬁcant
determinant for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. Moreover, the eects of output markets clearly
d e p e n d so nt h es i z eo ft h eﬁrm. Remember that from our model, b y signiﬁcantly dierent from
zero means that demand elasticity with respect to price is less than inﬁnity, revealing market
non-competitiveness. Such a feature only appears for larger ﬁrms. Besides, the model fails to
detect any uncertainty impact of investment prices since b u is never signiﬁcantly non-zero.
11Tab 2a. Equation (3.7), small ﬁrms
b c 0.834* 0.895* 0.865* 0.879* 0.836* 0.895* 0.864* 0.881*
b [b c] 0.103 0.091 0.100 0.091 0.103 0.092 0.100 0.091
b s -0.530* -0.531* -0.537* -0.512* -0.527* -0.530* -0.529* -0.510*
b [b s] 0.267 0.248 0.269 0.230 0.267 0.249 0.270 0.231
b y 0 0 -0.000 -0.002 0 0 0.000 0.009
b [b y] - - 0.012 0.011 - - 0.012 0.012
b k,1 0 0.691* 0 0.698* 0 0.692* 0 0.699*
b [b k,1] - 0.201 - 0.199 -0 . 2 0 2-0 . 1 9 9
b u 0000 1.107 1.200 0.987 1.404
b [b u] ---- 4.87 4.67 4.90 4.67
SG 30.6 31.1 31.6 33.5 33.4 33.7 34.1 34.9
M1 0.36 -0.59 0.06 0.98 2.01* 1.63 0.09 -1.00
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Tab 2b. Equation (3.7), large ﬁrms
b c 0.517* 0.533* 0.520* 0.520* 0.517* 0.534* 0.520* 0.521*
b [b c] 0.067 0.060 0.067 0.058 0.067 0.060 0.067 0.059
b s -0.301 -0.303 -0.308 -0.302 -0.300 -0.303 -0.308 -0.302
b [b s] 0.193 0.188 0.181 0.189 0.194 0.190 0.194 0.191
b y 0 0 -0.320* -0.317* 0 0 -0.320* -0.317*
b [b y] - - 0.112 0.110 - - 0.112 0.111
b k,1 00 . 3 4 4  00 . 3 5 1  00 . 3 4 4  00 . 3 5 1 
b [b k,1] - 0.191 - 0.192 - 0.193 - 0.193
b u 000 0 0.055 0.195 0.007 0.067
b [b u] --- - 3.12 3.11 3.12 3.11
SG 26.7 28.6 28.9 30.0 27.3 30.1 30.7 31.4
M1 -0.87 -0.00 0.87 -0.71 0.99 -0.87 1.23 0.03
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Leverage eect. I n s p e c t i o no ft a b l e s3 aa n d3 bﬁrst reveals asymmetry in the cash ﬂow eect
(b c). Higher indebted ﬁrms are indeed much more sensitive to changes in their internal source
of funds. However, asymmetry is more critical for the user cost of capital (b s).E s t i m a t e d
coe!cients b s are always signiﬁcant at 95 percent and get negative values for higher leverage.
This is in line with the recognition of a key role for the speciﬁc interest rate. A slight upward move
in that neoclassical variable has dramatic implications on investment, while a slight downward
change is quite desirable because these ﬁrms are also expected to be cash ﬂow constrained. Firms





investment schemes. Finally, and for the ﬁrst time, an uncertainty eect is detected (signiﬁcant
at 90 percent) for higher indebted ﬁrms. Surprisingly, this only appears in the model which
includes cash ﬂow, user cost and dynamics together. The positive value of b u suggests that
uncertainty in the price of investment acts as a disincentive to investment [see the binding
function of (3.7), inducing a negative value for ] . B u tw eh a v et ob ec a r e f u lw i t hs u c ha n
assertion since both estimated values and estimated standard errors of the uncertainty parameter





for lower debt level ﬁrms is now only signiﬁcant at 90 percent, while a perfect
competition assumption ﬁts higher debt level ﬁrms better. These results also tend to suggest
that many small (viz. large) ﬁrms have relatively high (viz. low) debt level ; we could refer them
to category 1 (small and highly indebted) ﬁrms vs category 2 (large with low debt level) ﬁrms.
Tab 3a. Equation (3.7), high debt level ﬁrms
b c 0.799* 0.791* 0.797* 0.790* 0.800* 0.783* 0.798* 0.788*
b [b c] 0.100 0.090 0.101 0.090 0.103 0.092 0.100 0.092
b s -0.612* -0.610* -0.637* -0.612* -0.620* -0.639* -0.621* -0.619*
b [b s] 0.280 0.261 0.282 0.260 0.280 0.259 0.280 0.262
b y 0 0 0.030* 0.015 0 0 0.019 0.010
b [b y] - - 0.013 0.013 - - 0.017 0.016
b k,1 0 0.707* 0 0.709* 0 0.700* 0 0.695*
b [b k,1] - 0.206 - 0.206 -0 . 2 0 5-0 . 2 0 6
b u 0000 2.070 2.301 0.987 2.004
b [b u] ---- 2.01 1.40 2.12 1.50
SG 24.1 24.9 25.6 27.8 25.3 25.9 26.8 28.0
M1 2.08* -0.05 0.64 0.08 -1.11 -0.49 1.13 0.56
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Tab 3b. Equation (3.7), low debt level ﬁrms
b c 0.467* 0.467* 0.483* 0.478* 0.499* 0.500* 0487* 0.495*
b [b c] 0.073 0.072 0.070 0.070 0.074 0.073 0.073 0.073
b s -0.171 -0.182 -0.170 -0.180 -0.164 -0.192 -0.160 -0.161
b [b s] 0.140 0.127 0.130 0.126 0.143 0.130 0.139 0.140
b y 00 - 0 . 2 8 7  -0.281* 00 - 0 . 2 7 3  -0.256
b [b y] - - 0.152 0.138 - - 0.155 0.147
b k,1 00 . 2 7 9  00 . 3 0 0 *00 . 2 8 0  00 . 3 0 6 
b [b k,1] - 0.153 - 0.153 - 0.154 - 0.153
b u 000 0 1.090 -0.723 0.926 0.555
b [b u] --- - 3.09 2.50 3.09 3.08
SG 29.9 30.4 30.6 31.6 29.8 34.7 35.2 36.8
M1 0.67 0.65 1.02 -1.44 1.63 1.00 -0.05 0.32
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Structural parameters. Table 4 contains retrieved values for the set of structural parame-
ters, based on the results obtained from the best equation for each regime.
The ﬁrst point to set forth is about adjustment costs, an important feature in our model.
Firms belonging to category 1 appear to be more sensitive to cash ﬂow, which implies that
the quadratic parameter of adjustment technology (1) is lower. Moreover, dynamics more
matters for these ﬁrms (). The cost of adding one extra unit of investment [see equation (3.2)]
is estimated using a static value for the rate of investment equal to the rate of deterioration
(¯ k =  =0 .10) [last line in the table]. At ﬁrst glance, it seems that, for category 2 ﬁrms, that cost
13is larger than for category 1 ﬁrms, especially ﬁrms with a low leverage. One explanation could
be that the rate of investment of category 2 ﬁrms is lower and does not vary much between two
successive periods, while it is more volatile for category 1 ﬁrms. Taken as a whole, adjustment
costs get realistic values. Otherwise, (minus) demand elasticity with respect to output price, %,
is estimated around 1.7 for category 2 ﬁrms, putting forward a realistic imperfect competition
eect for that category. Finally,  refers to uncertainty, a feature only signiﬁcantly dierent
from zero, and still at 90 percent level, for ﬁrms with higher leverage.
Table 4. Structural parameters, equation (3.7)
Full sample Small ﬁrms Large ﬁrms High leverage Low leverage
0 0.388 0.406 0.419 0.183 0.624
1 1.488 1.117 1.923 1.277 2.092
 0.891 0.772 0.675 0.894 0.627
% 4 4 1.640 4 1.701
 0 00 -2.933 0
GI[k = .10] 0.447 0.440 0.543 0.221 0.770
4.2.2. Reduced form approach
Our reduced form (3.9) model has been estimated for alternative regimes: (i) the whole set of
data, (ii) small versus large ﬁrms and (iii) high versus low leverage ﬁrms. Results are summarized
in tables 5, 6a and 6b, and 7a and 7b, respectively. Estimated coe!cients, standard errors, and
statistics related to instruments and serial correlation tests are presented as in the previous
tables. Notice that, since the cash ﬂow variable has been splited between output on the one
hand and wages on the other hand, we have to include the output variable as a necessary
regressor in the model, so that the null hypothesis of parameter 0
y will not be considered.
Full sample. In table 5 a user cost (hence interest rate) impact and a dynamic eect are
detected when the sample is taken as a whole. Indeed both b s and b k,1 are signiﬁcantly dierent
from zero at 95 percent in the second column of results. Also, the output variable (through b y)
plays a signiﬁcant role in explaining investment rates. Unfortunately, to explain this output eect
we are now unable to discriminate between a ﬁnancial reason (through a cash ﬂow constraint)
and an economic reason (through imperfect competition) since the wage rates coe!cient (b $)
is never signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. Also, notice that results do not vary when introducing
uncertainty, due to non-signiﬁcant b u.
14Tab 5. Equation (3.9), full sample
b $ -0,028 -0,037 -0,030 -0,038
b [b $] 0,090 0,089 0,091 0,091
b s -0,144 -0,181* -0,144 -0,183*
b [b s] 0,081 0,076 0,081 0,080
b y 0,217* 0,200* 0,218* 0,202*
b [b y] 0,050 0,043 0,051 0,046
b k,1 0 0,253* 0 0,255*
b [b k,1] - 0,090 -0 , 0 9 2
b u 0 0 -0,023 0,010
b [b u] - - 0,451 0,388
SG 20,1 17,9 20,7 18,3
M1 0,37 0,01 -1,07 0,15
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Tab 6a. Equation (3.9), small ﬁrms
b $ -0,036 -0,050 -0,042 -0,049
b [b $] 0,085 0,083 0,086 0,086
b s -0,215* -0,201* -0,214* -0,201*
b [b s] 0,086 0,081 0,087 0,085
b y 0,281* 0,269* 0,283* 0,270*
b [b y] 0,073 0,067 0,072 0,070
b k,1 0 0,287* 00 , 2 8 7
b [b k,1] - 0,093 -0 , 0 9 3
b u 0 0 0,003 0,016
b [b u] - - 0,320 0,294
SG 17,2 16,3 17,8 16,2
M1 -0,00 0,34 0,99 0,71
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
Tab 6b. Equation (3.9), large ﬁrms
b $ -0,014 -0,029 -0,017 -0,025
b [b $] 0,089 0,085 0,092 0,090
b s -0,187* -0,177* -0,187* -0,177*
b [b s] 0,076 0,075 0,077 0,077
b y 0,193* 0,181* 0,192* 0,183*
b [b y] 0,050 0,040 0,053 0,044
b k,1 0 0,212* 00 , 2 1 0 *
b [b k,1] - 0,085 -0 , 0 8 6
b u 0 0 -0,003 -0,049
b [b u] - - 0,267 0,258
SG 16,8 16,0 16,8 16,3
M1 0,42 -0,11 1,30 0,66
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
15Size eect Asymmetries appear in the estimates when splitting ﬁrms according to their size
(see tables 6a and 6b). Firms with lower capital stock tend to be more sensitive to the user
cost of capital as well as to the output ratio. Interestingly, a larger dierence between regime
estimates is observed for the output variable [b y =0 ,269 for small ﬁrms while b y =0 ,181 for
large ﬁrms]. Since we have again to reject a signiﬁcant impact of wages on investment, the
role detected for output rests on a (unknown) mix of the two eects (ﬁnancial and economic)
highlighted before.11 Next, although dynamics matters for each size of ﬁrms, it seems that the
time dimension is more able to explain investment for small ﬁrms than for large ﬁrms. Finally, a
link between uncertainty and investment is again questioned as our model is unable to estimate
it signiﬁcantly.
Leverage eect Results when ﬁrms are discriminated on a leverage basis are presented in
tables 7a and 7b. Clearly, the gap in terms of user cost (interest rate) and output sensitivity to
investment is larger when category 1 ﬁrms (see the structural approach) are spread according to
their debt levels rather than their size. Indeed, estimated coe!cients jump from -0,201 to -0,247
(user cost eect) and from 0,269 to 0,299 (output eect). Also dynamic parameters get larger
estimated values. Firms with low leverage appear to be less sensitive to user cost and output
than ﬁrms with high indebtedness. Actually, estimated reduced form coe!cients are very close
when the large ﬁrms are compared with the low leverage ones (both category 2 ﬁrms). But
it is worth noticing that b s is now signiﬁcant at 90 per cent only, for ﬁrms with low leverage.
When turning to the remaining parameters, a persistent absence of impact of both wages and
uncertainty is observed again. The price-uncertainty eect highlighted only in the structural
approach for high leverage ﬁrms is therefore not conﬁrmed.
Tab 7a. Equation (3.9), high debt level ﬁrms
b $ -0,084 -0,100 -0,129 -0,131
b [b $] 0,099 0,083 0,101 0,090
b s -0,251* -0,247* -0,253* -0,250*
b [b s] 0,107 0,103 0,111 0,105
b y 0,343* 0,299* 0,343* 0,300*
b [b y] 0,092 0,079 0,092 0,080
b k,1 0 0,313* 00 , 3 1 5 *
b [b k,1] - 0,134 -0 , 1 3 4
b u 0 0 0,072 0,054
b [b u] - - 0,387 0,326
SG 18,3 15,1 18,4 14,3
M1 -0,92 1,00 1,03 0,17
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
11But, as small ﬁrms are more likely to be in a perfect competition position, the signiﬁcance of output is
probably connected to a high correlation between this variable and cash ﬂow, inducing the detection of a regime
where (small) ﬁrms are constrained by their internal funds.
16Tab 7b. Equation (3.9), low debt level ﬁrms
b $ -0,000 -0,004 -0,071 -0,003
b [b $] 0,039 0,022 0,072 0,024
b s -0,188 -0,162 -0,189 -0,161
b [b s] 0,100 0,095 0,102 0,098
b y 0,181* 0,175* 0,186* 0,175*
b [b y] 0,047 0,043 0,049 0,044
b k,1 0 0,204* 00 , 2 0 4 *
b [b k,1] - 0,100 -0 , 1 0 1
b u 0 0 0,016 -0,009
b [b u] - - 0,210 0,194
SG 18,1 17,7 18,9 17,0
M1 -1,30 0,33 0,08 0,65
*S i g n i ﬁcant at 95%  Signiﬁcant at 90%
4.3. Policy simulation: when speciﬁc interest rates are pushed downward
Using the reduced form approach of this study, we are able to analyze the impact of a change
in speciﬁc interest rates - and by extension, of a change in the user cost -. We ﬁrst notice that
at period T, the rate of investment is estimated through
e ki,T = b 
0
k1ki,T1 + b yyi,T + b $$i,T + b ssi,T + b ub u00
i,T (4.1)
with dierent values according to regimes.
The scenario proposed to study the dynamic eect of speciﬁci n t e r e s tr a t eo nf u t u r ei n v e s t -
ment is standard. First of all, all variables but si,T remain constant during the simulation




is supposed to aect speciﬁc interest rates
through their speciﬁc random walk equation. For the remaining periods, interest rates do not










It is easy to show that the dynamic path of investment taken after this single shock is given
by
e ki,T+j =( b 
0
k1)je ki,T +
1  (b 
0
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In the long run, i.e. as j $4 , the rate of investment converges to its new equilibrium value
e ki,4 =
b yyi,T + b $$i,T + b pe iL
i,T+1 + b p + b ub u00
i,T









































































18To implement this simulation, we consider the 10-years response of investment to a 10 percent
downward movement in each speciﬁc interest rates in the year 2000 (levels are adapted to ﬁt
this policy).
Figure 1a compares the resulting simulated paths according to alternative regimes. Invest-
ment levels have been normalized with respect to their values estimated in 1999 (hence receiving
unitary values for that period). Figure 1b shows the dynamic paths followed by investment be-
fore reaching its new equilibrium value related to the target-speciﬁc interest rate level regime.
Unsurprisingly ﬁrms with a high leverage are those which beneﬁtm o s tf r o mt h ec u ti nt h e i r
speciﬁc interest rate, followed by relatively small sized ﬁrms. On the contrary the reaction of
large ﬁrms and above all of little indebted ﬁrms is below the average.
5. Conclusion: Lessons from the estimation and the simulation, and
avenues for further research
Taken as a whole, the opportunity to use individual ﬁrm data turns out to provide encouraging
and consistent results.
The dynamic nature of investment is conﬁrmed both in the structural approach and in the
reduced form approach. Not only this pattern is validated for the representative ﬁrm hypothesis,
but, in the case of speciﬁc regimes, the analysis can be reﬁned. The dynamic eect is indeed
more important for small ﬁrms and high leverage ﬁrms (category 1) than for large ﬁrms and
low leverage ﬁrms (category 2). Moreover, a less signiﬁcant impact is detected for category 2
ﬁrms through structural modeling. However, the explanation for this dynamics, related to the
adjustment costs of capital by a Euler equation approach, is less obvious in the solved version
of the model.
The user cost of capital, a key variable of this study, gets a dierent explanatory power
according to the way economic theory is validated. In the structural approach, the user cost of
capital is a relevant variable to explain investment only for category 1 ﬁrms (small - high debt),
while not signiﬁcant for category 2 ﬁrms (large - low debt). In the reduced form approach,
although the user cost is signiﬁcant in all regimes, a change in this variable has more impact
on investment for category 1 ﬁrms than for category 2 ﬁrms. High leverage ﬁrms are shown
to be the most sensitive to the interest rate, therefore more likely to be in a debt constraint
regime. Clearly, a linear link between the rate of investment and the interest rate (i.e. the
second econometric approach) is favorable to an interest rate policy whatever the regime can
be.
Asymmetry in the sensitivity of investment to cash ﬂow has also been detected in the struc-
tural approach. Actually, category 1 ﬁrms are more sensitive to cash ﬂow than category 2 ﬁrms.
Moreover, this asymmetry is sharper for high debt level ﬁrms. These ﬁrms, for which the interest
rate matters a lot, are therefore also very much dependent on the availability of internal funds.
A role for output is highlighted in all equations but the ability to provide a precise interpre-
tation of that role depends on the econometric approach. In the structural approach, there is
strong evidence that category 2 ﬁrms are characterized by an imperfect competition position,
while perfect competition ﬁts only the category 1 proﬁle (note this is also the case for the full
sample average). However, in the solved equation, we are unable to relate the signiﬁcance of
output to the existence of either a ﬁnite price elasticity or a cash ﬂow constraint, due to the
19non-signiﬁcant impact of wages in all regressions. But category 1 ﬁrms seem to be more sensitive
to output than category 2 ﬁrms.
Finally, investment price uncertainty has never been retained to explain investment rates,
except for high leverage ﬁrms in the structural modeling where a negative sign appears.12
Regarding the simulation exercise, unsurprisingly ﬁrms with high leverage are those which
beneﬁtm o s tf r o mt h ecut in their speciﬁc interest rate, fed by a cut in the market interest rate,
followed by relatively small-sized ﬁrms. On the contrary, the reaction of large ﬁrms and above
all of little indebted ﬁrms is below the average.
To sum up, the empirical exercise conducted in this paper primarily aimed at testing the
possibility to estimate structural and reduced forms of investment functions on a large panel of
Belgian ﬁrms observed over a relatively long period, in order to evaluate the eect of a monetary
policy under the assumption that such an eect can dier according to ﬁrms’ characteristics.
For that purposes, we made a distinction among ﬁrms based on their size, measured by
their stock of assets, on the one hand, and on their degree of leverage on the other hand.
Unsurprisingly, the results that we obtained support the view that small ﬁrms, and still more
highly indebted ﬁrms, are especially sensitive to the user cost of capital and to the level of
their cash ﬂow. By contrast, large and relatively less indebted ﬁrms are more likely to face
non competitiveness on their market, which make them sensitive to output, and thus to the
demand for the goods that they produce. The dynamic character of investment is also strongly
supported by the data. However, the role of uncertainty received little empirical support, maybe
due to the type of uncertainty that we introduced, i.e. uncertainty on the price of investment
goods, which is however a way to introduce some business cycle eect since investment goods
can be regarded as rather sensitive to economic ﬂuctuations.
The simulation of a decrease in the ﬁrms speciﬁc interest rate, possibly fed by a cut in the
interest rate decided by monetary authorities, conﬁrms the lessons from the estimation exercise.
The data base we used in this research is especially rich and could be used for a series of
further exercises. First of all it would be useful to complete the present work with a companion
investigation aiming at discussing the impact on the dierent categories of ﬁrms of a cut in the
speciﬁce ective tax rate, fed by a cut in the corporate tax rate decided by ﬁscal authorities.
Beyond that, a huge amount of other exercises using that panel of ﬁrms has now been made
possible, which can aim either at testing theories and econometric methods or at providing
economic policy-makers with relevant information as to the possible impact of considered policy
orientations.
12Cassimon, Engelen, Meersman and Van Wouwe [2002] observed a signiﬁcant relation between volatility
and investment for Belgian manufacturing ﬁrms, with a larger eect when considering irreversible investment.
Alternatively, uncertainty could be measured from directly available expectation data, as in Butzen, Fuss and
Vermeulen [2002], who found that uncertainty depresses ﬁrms investment in Belgium. These studies, however,
did not consider the ﬁnancing constraint issue.
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24A. The data set
Data used in this exercise come from the balance sheets reported accounts data base of the
National Bank of Belgium. We decided to extract from that data base, an unbalanced panel of
2329 ﬁrms observed between 11 and 15 years. A larger coverage would have been possible but
then on a shorter length of time; we decided to give priority to the length of the series in order
to go across possible economic cycles.
A.1. Deﬁnitions
Data come from three dierent sources and thus are ﬁrm-speciﬁc, sector-speciﬁco rm a r k e t -
speciﬁc.
A.1.1. Firm-speciﬁcd a t a
T h e s ed a t ac o m ef r o mﬁrms’ reported accounts and have been provided by the National Bank of
Belgium. Each item between brackets corresponds to the codes used by the National Bank of
Belgium’s Centrale des Bilans. Distinctions are introduced when the deﬁnitions dier depending
on the accounting pattern (abridged accounts vs complete accounts).
Investment (pI
i,tIi,t):Acquisitions of ﬁxed assets, including produced ﬁxed assets
[8169] - Sales and disposals [-8179] + Acquisitions of revaluation gains from third
parties [8229] - Depreciation and amounts written down cancelled owing to sales
[-8309]
Output, or value added (pi,tYi,t) : (i) Abridged accounts : Operating proﬁt
[70/61] + Operating loss [61/70]; (ii) Complete accounts : Operating income [70/74]
- Raw materials and consumables [60, p. C4] - Services and other goods [61, p. C4]
Wage costs (wi,tLi,t) : Remuneration, social security and pensions (i) Abridged
accounts : [-62]; (ii) Complete accounts : [62]
Dividends (Di,t) : [694]
Long-term debt (BL
i,t):(i) Abridged accounts : Etablissement de crédit, dettes
de location-ﬁnancement et assimilés [172/3, p. A3]; (ii) Complete accounts : Dettes
de location-ﬁnancement [472, p. C3] + Etablissement de crédits [473, p. C3]
Short-term debt (BS
i,t):Financial debt in credit institutions payable within one
year [430/8, p. A3/C3] + Debt at over one year falling due [42, p. A3]
Interest expenses (IEi,t) : (i) Abridged accounts : Financial charges [-65, p. A4]
- Interest subsidies granted by public authorities and recorded as income [9126, p.
A10]; (ii) Complete accounts : Debt charge [650, p. C4] - Interest subsidies granted
by public authorities and recorded as income [9126, p. C16]
Asset (Ai,t) : Total assets [20/58]
25Equity (Ei,t) : Capital [10] + Share premium account [11] + Revaluation surplus
[12] + Reserves [13]
Corporate tax rate (i,t):Income tax [-67/77] / (Proﬁt for the period [70/67] +
Loss for the period [67/70] + Income tax [-67/77] )
A.1.2. Sector-speciﬁcd a t a
Those data come from Belgian National Accounts, database Belgostat.
Price of investment (pI
s,t):Deﬂator of Gross ﬁxed capital formation. This is ac-
tually the speciﬁc price of investment when this last variable is dealt with separately.
Price of output (ps,t) :D e ﬂator of Gross value added
A.1.3. Market-speciﬁcd a t a
These data come a.o. from the Mémentos économiques et ﬁnanciers, a Kluwer publication.
Long-term interest rate (iL
t ):Interest rate charged by SNCI/NMKN on invest-
ment credits
Short-term interest rate (iS
t ):Moyenne du taux d’intérêt sur crédits de caisse
et du taux d’intérêt sur avances à 4 mois ou 3 mois.
A.1.4. Other variables
Cash ﬂow (CFi,t):pi,tYi,t  wi,tLi,t
Capital stock at replacement cost (pI
i,tKi,t) : Capital stock has been constructed










As a starting value, we use the capital stock at historic cost, i.e. ﬁxed assets [22/27].
Based on previous studies on investment in Belgium, the rate of deterioration has
been ﬁxed at 10%.
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Before undertaking any empirical analysis, we have to remove inconsistent data and outliers.
26A.2.1. Inconsistent data.
All the ﬁrms belong to the manufacturing industry. In order to be consistent with our economic
model, we exclude ﬁrms with negative investment and negative output. We select only ﬁrms
with positive long-run debt and positive interest expenses. For the record, we expect these
quantities to exist in order to build the speciﬁc long-run interest rate. Also we only keep ﬁrms
with a tax rate and a long-run interest rate between 0 and 1. Finally, we select ﬁrms with data
available for at least 11 years, since dynamics eects are considered in our model.
A.2.2. Outliers.
Our way of treating outliers consists in removing the ﬁrst and last percentile of the rate of
investment, the cash ﬂow ratio, the output ratio and the user cost of capital. This procedure is
rather random, but has the advantage of keeping asymmetries in the distributions unaltered.
A.3. Some statistical results and ﬁgures
F i r s to fa l l ,w ep r e s e n tt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms after the selection stage of the data. Our ﬁnal data
set is an unbalanced panel of 2329 ﬁrms observed between 11 and 15 years.
Table 0. Number of ﬁrms






Next, univariate statistics for two key variables are provided, namely the speciﬁc interest
rate and a percentage measure of ﬁnancing source [total debt / (total debt + equity)]. They
are both summarized in statistical tables 1 and 2, while graphics are presented in ﬁgures 2 and
3. We also present statistics related to the speciﬁc tax rate in statistical table 3.
27Statistical Table 1. Speciﬁci n t e r e s tr a t e
iL
i,t mean minimum maximum std. dev. skewness kurtosis
1985 0.1768 0.0135 0.6724 0.124 2.27 7.44
1986 0.1632 0.0174 0.6989 0.121 2.53 9.13
1987 0.1411 0.0136 0.6313 0.113 2.89 12.23
1988 0.1295 0.0145 0.5896 0.106 3.12 14.34
1989 0.1244 0.0144 0.5912 0.102 3.65 17.34
1990 0.1328 0.0159 0.5717 0.106 3.31 15.78
1991 0.1408 0.0181 0.5693 0.107 3.27 13.91
1992 0.1440 0.0253 0.6019 0.099 3.16 14.61
1993 0.1501 0.0255 0.5930 0.103 3.32 16.63
1994 0.1394 0.0257 0.5620 0.092 2.83 11.67
1995 0.1387 0.0233 0.5837 0.101 3.52 18.06
1996 0.1287 0.0234 0.5586 0.095 3.35 16.27
1997 0.1206 0.0188 0.4872 0.087 2.92 12.17
1998 0.1172 0.0150 0.6334 0.103 3.85 20.56
1999 0.1086 0.0183 0.5540 0.101 3.64 17.99
Figure 2. Speciﬁc and market interest rate

























The normal line is the observed speciﬁc interest rate, the bold line is the SNCI/NMKN interest rate,
and the dotted lines are the extreme values observed for the speciﬁc interest rate
28Statistical Table 2. debt vs equity
Bi,t/(E + B)i,t mean minimum maximum std. dev. asymmetr. kurtosis
1985 0.1875 0.0199 0.4098 0.095 0.34 -0.51
1986 0.1909 0.0134 0.4176 0.098 0.29 -0.59
1987 0.2013 0.0189 0.4228 0.100 0.20 -0.59
1988 0.2058 0.0169 0.4251 0.100 0.19 -0.62
1989 0.2146 0.0156 0.4334 0.099 0.08 -0.57
1990 0.2173 0.0193 0.4186 0.098 0.01 -0.75
1991 0.2198 0.0211 0.4200 0.099 0.02 -0.73
1992 0.2245 0.0236 0.4341 0.100 -0.02 -0.72
1993 0.2223 0.0242 0.4337 0.101 0.04 -0.72
1994 0.2185 0.0223 0.4303 0.099 0.08 -0.58
1995 0.2192 0.0203 0.4291 0.099 0.04 -0.60
1996 0.2186 0.0215 0.4397 0.102 0.01 -0.66
1997 0.2134 0.0187 0.4409 0.103 0.11 -0.45
1998 0.2118 0.0156 0.4306 0.103 0.11 -0.53
1999 0.2121 0.0127 0.4283 0.105 0.06 -0.74




























D e b t / (D e b t +  E q u ity )
29Statistical Table 3. Speciﬁct a xr a t e
i,t mean minimum 95% maximum std. dev. asymmetr. kurtosis
1985 0.1566 0 0.5179 0.8040 0.1987 1.22 1.06
1986 0.1621 0 0.5017 0.8027 0.1958 1.15 1.04
1987 0.1567 0 0.4860 0.8140 0.1912 1.27 1.59
1988 0.1472 0 0.4632 0.7937 0.1845 1.36 1.97
1989 0.1715 0 0.5379 0.8327 0.2043 1.11 0.87
1990 0.1948 0 0.5964 0.8771 0.2219 0.95 0.34
1991 0.1909 0 0.6357 0.9082 0.2283 1.06 0.56
1992 0.1961 0 0.6426 0.9055 0.2319 1.11 0.59
1993 0.1826 0 0.6613 0.9116 0.2404 1.14 0.47
1994 0.2107 0 0.7021 0.9261 0.2486 0.93 0.01
1995 0.2109 0 0.6909 0.9221 0.2458 0.92 0.03
1996 0.2114 0 0.6925 0.9237 0.2455 0.92 0.06
1997 0.2108 0 0.6519 0.9008 0.2357 0.85 0.01
1998 0.2111 0 0.6478 0.8978 0.2330 0.85 0.08
1999 0.2162 0 0.6517 0.9165 0.2324 0.85 0.18
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